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THE CONTESTED RIGHT TO VOTE
Richard Briffault *
THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED STATES. By Alexander Keyssar. New York: Basic Books.
2000. Pp. xxiv, 467. $30.
I. INTRODUCTION
For those who believe the United States is a representative democ-
racy with a government elected by the people, the events of late 2000
must have been more than a little disconcerting. In the election for our
most important public office - our only truly national office' - the
candidate who received the most popular votes was declared the loser
while his second place opponent, who had received some 540,000
fewer votes, was the winner.2 This result turned on the outcome in
Florida, where approximately 150,000 ballots cast were found not to
contain valid votes. Further, due to flaws in ballot design, thousands of
other Florida ballots almost certainly failed to reflect the intentions of
the voters who cast them. The number of uncounted ballots and votes
arguably misrepresented by the butterfly ballot was far greater than
the difference in votes between the first-place and second-place presi-
dential candidates in the state. Studies later found that between four
and six million votes were lost nationwide in the 2000 election, with
1.5 to 2 million votes lost due to faulty voting equipment and confus-
ing ballots. Several states had higher rates of spoiled presidential bal-
lots than Florida.
The 2000 election also generated two Supreme Court decisions
with problematic implications for the right to vote in presidential elec-
tions. In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,4 a unanimous
• Vice-Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law
School; B.A. 1974, Columbia; J.D. 1977, Harvard. - Ed.
1. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 795 (1983) ("[Tlhe President and the Vice
President of the United States are the only elected officials who represent all the voters in
the Nation.").
2. The final results for the 2000 presidential election gave Al Gore 50,999,897 votes, or
48.38% of the total and George W. Bush 50,456,002, or 47.87%. Gore's margin was 543,895.
See http://fecwebl.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002).
3. REPORT OF THE CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, VOTING: WHAT
IS, WHAT COULD BE 7-9, 17 (2001) [hereinafter CALTECH/MIT STUDY].
4. 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
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Court indicated that the Florida Supreme Court lacked authority to
protect the rights of voters by extending the period for conducting
manual recounts of disputed presidential ballots.' Bush v. Gore6 flatly
declared that "[tihe individual citizen has no federal constitutional
right to vote in presidential elections." Rather, "the state legislature's
power to select the manner for appointing electors is plenary; it may, if
it so chooses, select the electors itself"'7 - which, indeed, had been the
plan of Florida's Republican legislature if the recount ordered by the
state supreme court had resulted in a victory for Vice-President Gore.8
Bush v. Gore held that the Florida Supreme Court's effort to require a
statewide manual recount of the undervote ballots9 - that is, those
ballots cast by voters that the ballot-counting machinery determined
contained no vote - was unconstitutional.
Yet, Bush v. Gore may have also ushered in a dramatic extension
of federal constitutional protection of the right to vote when the Court
held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to the mechanics of election administration - a subject tradi-
tionally left to the states, and often delegated by the states to local
governments. The Court found that the Florida recount order was
constitutionally flawed because it failed to address the differences in
standards used by local election officials in evaluating similarly
marked ballots.1"
Neither the dismissal of the presidential popular vote and Florida's
uncounted voters, nor the new federal constitutional review of local
election administration - nor the combination of the two - would
come as a surprise to a reader of Alexander Keyssar's11 magisterial his-
tory of the right to vote in the United States. Published before the
2000 election, The Right to Vote's major themes are sharply reflected
in the 2000 election's legal issues and their judicial resolution.
Keyssar's central point, captured in his subtitle, is the deeply
"contested" nature of the vote in the United States over more than
two centuries. Keyssar directly challenges the "Whig interpretation
12
5. Id. at 77.
6. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
7. Id. at 104.
8. See, e.g., ABNER S. GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE To
THE LEGAL BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY 163-67 (2001).
9. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
10. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105-09.
11. Professor of History and Public Policy, Duke University.
12. P. xvii. The "Whig interpretation" of the expansion of the right to vote in America
has been previously flagged and challenged. See Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in
the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335, 336-37 (1989). The phrase "Whig inter-
pretation" comes from Herbert Butterfield's critique of those histories of England which
treated English history as consisting of gradual but inevitable reform and progress. See
HERBERT BUTrERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (1951). A leading
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of the history of the right to vote, with its "triumphalist presumption"
(pp. xvii, 68-70) of a steady, inexorable, "unidirectional" (p. xviii) en-
largement of the franchise. Instead, Keyssar demonstrates that the his-
tory of the suffrage has been marked by both forward and backward
movement. Efforts to enlarge the polity and include previously ex-
cluded groups have been countered by doubts about democracy, resis-
tance to suffrage expansion, and adoption of measures reducing the
opportunity to vote. In the 1960s, however, a corner was apparently
turned, and today nearly all adult citizens are entitled to vote. Even so,
the earlier history continues to leave its mark on our political process.
The 2000 election and Bush v. Gore nicely embody our conflicted
heritage: the eighteenth century provisions that vest selection of the
president in an Electoral College chosen according to rules set by state
legislatures; the emergence of the presidential popular vote, along
with administrative practices that often operate to impede the ability
to vote; and the late twentieth century effort of the Supreme Court to
promote the equal treatment of voters. The public debate over the re-
count also brought forward to the present some of the past conflicts
over the scope of the franchise - with the rhetoric of "make every
vote count" echoing earlier democratic calls to.widen the vote, and the
disdain manifested by some commentators and judges 3 for voters who
failed to follow instructions on how to punch out their chads or were
bewildered by the butterfly ballot recalling previous public assertions
about the unfitness of some groups for the ballot ..
Although the central thrust of Keyssar's study is his persuasive
challenge to the assumption of a progressive unfolding of voting rights,
his book ends on a relatively upbeat note, emphasizing the broad
availability of the franchise today. His concern is to show how hard it
was and how "very long" (p. 316) it took to get to this point in our his-
tory. Examining this history will be the focus of Part II of this Review.
Yet, although Keyssar's book is'titled The Right to Vote, both his
history and current legal doctrine raise questions about whether and
to what extent voting is a right at all. Initially, as Keyssar demon-
strates, voting was not seen as a right, but as a privilege to be provided
to those thought best qualified to participate in governing the commu-
nity. Even as the franchise was expanded, the vote continued to retain
something of its foundation in government-bestowed privilege. Today,
the vote comes closer to being a right of all members of the political
community. Yet, as I will suggest in Part III, voting's status as a right is
"Whig" treatment of the right to vote in the United States is CHILTON WILLIAMSON,
AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860 (1960).
13. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("No reason-
able person would call it... a 'rejection of legal votes'.., when electronic or electromag-
netic equipment.., fails to count those ballots that are not marked in the manner that...
voting instructions explicitly and prominently specify.").
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still contested. Some groups remain unenfranchised. There is no right
to have decisions made by popular vote. Most importantly, even
where voting is provided, a wide variety of political considerations and
institutions - federalism, legislative districting, ballot access rules, the
costs of administration, campaign finance law - operate to constrain
voters' choices. Government still gets to shape the role of voting in the
political system even if it has less control over who gets to vote. The
significance of popular voting in our political process remains a matter
of politics as much as it is a matter of rights.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FRANCHISE
Keyssar divides the history of voting in America into four long pe-
riods: (i) the colonial era, when the most important qualification for
voting was ownership of property; (ii) the first democratic ascendancy,
running from the end of the eighteenth century to the eve of the Civil
War, when property qualifications were largely eliminated and most
adult white male citizens (and some noncitizens) were enfranchised;
(iii) a "slow Thermidor" between the Civil War and the Second World
War when various restrictions and procedures rolled back some of the
gains of the antebellum period and to a considerable degree offset the
suffrage expansions produced by the Fifteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments, and (iv) a resurgence of democratic commitments after
World War II, which led to a broader suffrage and significant federal
legislative and judicial protection of the vote.
A. Before the Revolution
"[T]he lynchpin of both colonial and British suffrage regulations
was the restriction of voting to adult men who owned property" (p. 5).
Voting was not a natural right but a state-granted privilege - as the
term "franchise" suggests 4 - and that privilege was extended only to
those believed capable of providing sound governance for the polity.
For people of that era, only property ownership could assure the ca-
pacity of the voter to decide questions of community governance.
Property supplied independence; those without property were pre-
sumed to be economically dependent on and subservient to others. As
a result, theywould be subject to political manipulation and control by
their economic patrons and social betters.15 The propertyless, with the
rest of the community, would be better off with virtual representation
14. As Keyssar explains, "in early English usage, the word franchise referred to a privi-
lege, immunity or freedom that a state could grant, while the term suffrage alluded to inter-
cessory prayers." P. 9.
15. See Steinfeld, supra note 12, at 342-48 (describing contemporary views concerning
economic, social and political relationships of dependence and governance).
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by the propertied. As Keyssar slyly notes, the concern that the prop-
ertyless lacked "will" and would simply be tools for a wealthy elite was
sometimes joined with the opposite fear that the propertyless might
have too much will and use their votes to advance their own interests
(p. 11). But the dominant focus was on the connection between prop-
erty and the capacity for independent judgment. The property test and
other colonial era franchise rules 16 limited the vote to about sixty per-
cent of adult white males, albeit with considerable variation from col-
ony to colony, within colonies, and over time.
B. The First Democratic Ascendancy
Over the first half of the nineteenth century, property require-
ments were progressively relaxed and ultimately abolished. While
many of the states initially replaced property ownership with a tax-
payment requirement, by 1855 all but six states had dropped their in-
sistence that voters pay taxes, and in several of the states that retained
the tax-payment test the amount of tax required was quite minimal.
As a result, the vast majority of the states enfranchised most of their
adult white male residents.
The Revolution and its aftermath were critical to changing views
about the nature of the suffrage.
[T]he political and military trauma of breaking with a sovereign power,
fighting a war, and creating a new state - served to crack the ideological
framework that had upheld and justified a limited suffrage. The concept
of virtual representation was undermined; the notion that a legitimate
government required the 'consent' of the governed became a staple of
political thought; and a new, contagious language of rights and equality
was widely heard. (pp. 24-25)
Property ownership requirements came to be seen as inconsistent with
the claims of nonowners - Revolutionary War veterans, militiamen,
propertyless taxpayers, and others - who were subject to government
regulation, and, thus, had a stake in the political process.
The growing sense that voting was the means of self-government
and not just a privilege of propertied independence combined with
16. These requirements included religion, race, gender, residency, and citizenship, al-
though the rules varied considerably across the colonies and were not always spelled out in
law. On occasion, property ownership trumped other concerns, so that nonresident property
owners, or property-owning blacks and women could vote in some colonies at least for some
elections. P. 6. On the other hand, religious, racial or gender requirements tended to define
the political community and resulted in the disfranchisement of some property owners. P. 6.
Some of these exclusions might also be connected to the notion of independence. Thus, most
colonies barred women from voting "because they were thought to be dependent on adult
men." P. 6.
Voting rules might also vary within a colony, with qualifications to vote in local elec-
tions, especially in the larger cities, differing from qualifications to vote for colonial or pro-
vincial officers. P. 6.
1510 [Vol. 100:1506
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economic and social change. With the onset of urbanization and indus-
trialization, more men earned a living without owning property. Even
on the farm, more men owned smaller holdings or worked the land as
lessees or tenant farmers, not freeholders. As a result, a growing por-
tion of adult white men were unable to meet property ownership re-
quirements. At the dawn of the republic, property tests might have
been able to coexist with emerging political egalitarian beliefs because
Americans visualized their nation as one in which property, and,
therefore, the suffrage, was broadly distributed. By the mid-nineteenth
century, the only way to provide the broad suffrage the democratic
ideology of the times required to an increasingly propertyless popula-
tion was by abolishing property-ownership requirements.
"Democracy ascendant" (p. 26) had other consequences. Religious
tests were dropped, some states liberalized their residency require-
ments, and a handful of states enfranchised resident aliens who had
"declared" an intent to seek citizenship.17
Yet, voting did not become a right, either descriptively or norma-
tively, even for adult white men. A dozen states "preserved a link be-
tween economic status and enfranchisement" (p. 61) by denying the
right to vote to paupers. By receiving public relief, paupers "had sur-
rendered legal control of their own time and labor" (p. 62) and were
legally dependent. The pauperage exclusion reflected the continuing,
albeit diminished, power of the pre-Revolutionary independence
model of voting. In many states, the franchise was also withheld from
men who had committed "infamous crimes."18 Voting, thus, remained
to some extent a privilege of the morally qualified and the economi-
cally independent, although independence was defined in terms of the
absence of dependency on the state rather than the ownership of capi-
tal. Voting was also largely a privilege of white males. Racial exclu-
sions hardened, with all but five states limiting the franchise to whites.
And in 1807, New Jersey, the one state that had permitted women to
vote, limited the franchise to men. With the demise of property tests,
race and gender had become more salient for voting.
Moreover, suffrage was a state matter, not an aspect of national
citizenship. The federal Constitution largely sidestepped the question
of the vote. Only one branch of the federal government - the House
of Representatives - was popularly elected. Rather than set federal
voting criteria, the Constitution provided that qualifications for voting
for members of the House of Representatives would vary from state to
state according to each state's qualifications for voting for the "most
17. See pp. 32-33. Between 1848 and the start of the Civil War, six states in the Upper
Midwest and the West, seeking to encourage new settlement as well as to acknowledge the
importance of resident aliens to their communities, adopted "declarant" alien suffrage.
18. By the eve of the Civil War, two dozen states disfranchised men who had committed
serious crimes, although "such provisions were neither universal nor uniform." P. 63.
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numerous Branch of the State Legislature."19 The members of the
Senate were chosen by the state legislatures and not by the voters.0
The President and Vice-President were elected by an Electoral
College consisting of electors appointed by each state "in such manner
as the legislature thereof shall direct. 21 Voting was in no sense a fed-
eral constitutional right.
Keyssar argues that the expansion of the vote in this period was
due, in part, to the failure of contemporary leaders to foresee the fu-
ture development of a large industrial working class. Although indus-
trialization, urbanization, and immigration had begun, the social con-
sequences of these developments were not yet "clearly or widely
visible" (p. 69). There were artisans, mechanics, and shopkeepers, but
no large urban proletariat. Although agriculture witnessed a growth in
the percentage of smallholders and tenant farmers, there was no
European-style landless peasantry - or rather there was one, but it
was black, largely enslaved, and, barred by racial exclusions even if
economic barriers to voting were lifted. The elimination of economic
tests was intended to enfranchise the lower middle class, craft workers,
and yeoman farmers, not the industrial working class or the peasantry;
according to Keyssar, the suffrage would not have been so widened if
there had been a large industrial working class or free peasantry.22
In correcting for the traditional assumption of an innate American
commitment to democracy, Keyssar may not give sufficient credit to
the decisions by thousands of officeholders, convention delegates, and
referendum voters in many states to voluntarily extend the franchise
from themselves to others not entitled to vote. Without the prodding
of Congress, the President, the courts, or, for the most part, massive
public protests 3 - the factors that drove the franchise extensions of
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. One hundred and twenty-five years later, the direct
election of Senators followed the same pattern. Instead of adopting a federal voting rule, the
Seventeenth Amendment provided that the qualifications for voting in Senate elections are
the same as those "requisite for the most numerous branch of the State legislatures."
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
22. See pp. 67-70.
23. The most dramatic exception to the general pattern of peaceful expansion of the suf-
frage was the so-called Dorr War in Rhode Island. Pp. 71-76. Rhode Island continued to be
governed by its colonial charter, which limited the vote to "freemen" who owned real estate
valued at $134 or rented property for at least $7, into the 1840s. In the eighteenth century,
three-quarters of the adult males met the requirements, but due to rapid urbanization and
industrialization by the 1830s substantially less than half the adult white men could vote.
Many of those excluded were factory workers and immigrants, including many Irish
Catholics. Propertied opposition repeatedly blocked charter reform efforts. "The conflict
came to a boiling point in 1841" when mechanics and workingmen formed a new, militant
organization, convened their own People's Convention, and there drafted a constitution
providing the vote to all adult white men who met a one-year residency requirement. P. 72.
In January 1842 a clear majority of Rhode Island adult white males voted to ratify the new
constitution. The charter government, however, refused to yield and passed laws imposing
1512 [Vol. 100:1506
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the post-World War II period - elected representatives repeatedly
proposed to extend the franchise to those who had not elected them,
with those actions often confirmed by already-enfranchised voters. By
1855 voting was more than a privilege of the propertied or associated
with a special capacity for political decisionmaking. Instead, voting
was to a considerable degree an attribute of membership in the politi-
cal community. The pauperage, felony, race, and gender restrictions -
as well as the less controversial rules requiring residency, and, in most
states, citizenship - were as much definitions of the political commu-
nity as qualifications for voting.
Still, Keyssar supports his more jaundiced view by pointing out
that the first efforts to curtail the franchise began around 1855 in just
those states where industrialization and immigration were most politi-
cally salient.24 His critical analysis gains further traction from the his-
tory of the suffrage after the Civil War.
C. "Slow Thermidor": From the Civil War to World War II
The heart of Keyssar's study is the "slow Thermidor" (p. 80) be-
tween the Civil War and World War II when faith in democracy was
challenged by doubts about the ability of ordinary people to exercise
the vote intelligently, and class, ethnic, and racist prejudices gave rise
to new restrictions on the franchise.
harsh penalties on those who participated in elections and meetings under the People's
Constitution. For several weeks in 1842, the "People's" government and the charter gov-
ernment contended for power. On May 18, the People's governor, Thomas Dorr, and a small
group of armed followers "attempted to exercise their sovereign power by assembling in
front of the state arsenal and demanding that it be turned over to them. When their demands
were refused, they attacked the arsenal, but both of their cannons misfired, and the Dorrites
were then beaten back .... Over the course of the next few months, radical suffrage advo-
cates attempted a few other military escapades (resulting in several deaths), with similar dis-
heartening and tragicomic results." P. 74. The charter government, backed by federal troops,
remained in control. But chastened by events, it adopted new franchise requirements permit-
ting all native-born adult males (including blacks) to vote if they met a minimal taxpaying
requirement. Foreign-born naturalized citizens, however, were obliged to meet a property
test and a lengthy residency requirement. In addition, only property owners were allowed to
vote in Providence municipal elections.
24. Connecticut in 1855 and Massachusetts in 1857 became the first states to adopt liter-
acy tests. Massachusetts confirmed the anti-immigration intent of the test by also adopting
the nation's first grandfather clause - an exclusion from the test for all citizens who had
previously voted. P. 86. In 1859, Massachusetts passed a measure requiring newly naturalized
citizens to wait two years until they could vote. This was subsequently repealed.
Keyssar also cites Rhode Island's Dorr War as supporting his thesis that the franchise
was extended to the propertyless only because there was no industrial working class. As he
notes, Rhode Island had the most urbanized and industrialized workforce in the United
States, and one of the highest rates of immigration. In Rhode Island, white male suffrage
would have enfranchised the working class, not the middle class. Consequently, Rhode
Island's landowners resisted suffrage expansion more intensely than did their counterparts in
any other state. See p. 71.
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The right of black Americans to vote was a central issue in this pe-
riod. Blacks demanded the ballot as a means of protection against hos-
tile white Southerners, as an expression of their new status as free citi-
zens, and as an acknowledgment of their loyalty and of the sacrifices
black soldiers had made for the Union cause. However, racism, some-
times thinly veiled by references to the lack of political experience and
education of the formerly enslaved, initially led most states to reject
efforts to repeal racial tests for voting." This led to the first federal in-
volvement in state suffrage questions. Initially, Congress took "an
oblique approach." The Fourteenth Amendment provided that a state
that denies the vote to its adult male citizens "except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime" would have its representation in Congress
reduced. This was a "clear constitutional frown at racial discrimina-
tion" (pp. 90-91), and one likely to affect the South far more than the
North due to the concentration of blacks in the Southern states.26 But
by not flatly barring discrimination, the Fourteenth Amendment also
"tacitly recognized the right of individual states to erect racial barri-
ers."
27
Intense Southern hostility to freed blacks, including violent opposi-
tion to black efforts to vote,28 drove, the Republicans in Congress to
take a more radical approach to protect black voting rights. The
Reconstruction Act of 1867 authorized federal military rule for the re-
gion and made re-admission of the secessionist states contingent on
their ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and adoption of state
constitutions that permitted blacks to vote on the same terms as
whites. Resistance to black enfranchisement remained powerful, how-
ever. Faced with Democratic electoral gains in the North and fearing
that "control of the national government might be slipping from their
grasp" (pp. 93-94), Congressional Republicans moved to entrench the
25. Between 1863 and 1870, black enfranchisement was defeated in fifteen Northern
states and territories, passing in just two Northern states with small black populations. See
p. 89.
26. The representation clause was also a response to the de facto elimination of the no-
torious three-fifths clause by the abolition of slavery. Formerly enslaved blacks would now
be fully counted in determining the allocation of seats in the House of Representatives and
votes in the Electoral College. This would sharply increase the representation of the South.
Unless steps were taken to enfranchise blacks, one perverse effect of the Civil War would be
to strengthen the national political power of the unrepentant whites in the former Confeder-
acy.
27. P. 91. Moreover, by its express reference to adult "male inhabitants" in setting the
baseline for full enfranchisement, the Amendment implicitly confirmed the disfranchisement
of women. In addition, in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court interpreted the "rebel-
lion or other crime" proviso as a constitutional justification for the disfranchisement of con-
victed felons. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). For further discussion of the
disfranchisement of felons, see infra Section III.A.
28. In New Orleans, "one of the most flagrant incidents of violence" occurred when ad-
vocates of black suffrage attempted to hold a constitutional convention. Thirty-four blacks
and four whites were killed, with scores of others wounded. P. 91.
1514 [Vol. 100:1506
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voting rights of Southern blacks - and to add black voters to the Re-
publican base in both the North and the South - with an additional
constitutional amendment. Radical Republicans pushed for a broad
affirmation of the right to vote. Indeed, the Senate passed Senator
Wilson's proposal to ban any denial of the vote to a citizen based on
"race, color, nativity, property, education, or creed" (p. 91). Ulti-
mately, however, Congress adopted a much more limited measure
banning discrimination based only on race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude.
Senator Wilson and his allies had argued that an amendment
phrased in terms of race and slavery alone would be circumvented.
Their concerns were ultimately vindicated by the course of events in
the South. Congress initially responded vigorously to the "politicized
vigilante violence" (p. 106) against black candidates and voters and
their white Republican allies by making interference with voting a
federal offense, punishable in federal court, and authorizing the
President to deploy the army to defend the electoral process. As part
of the settlement of the disputed election of 1876, however, federal
troops were withdrawn from the South. In 1878, Democrats won con-
trol of Congress and further reduced the federal role in protecting
black and white Republican voting rights against white Democratic
"Redeemers." The next dozen years were a "period of limbo and con-
testation" (p. 108), with Southern Democrats using gerrymandering,
complicated ballot configurations, administrative devices, and occa-
sional violence and fraudulent vote counts to curtail black voting, but
blacks, in alliance with white Republicans and some groups of poor
and upcountry white Democrats, continued to contest elections, vote,
and win office.
The beginning of the end came in 1889-91 when, although the
Republicans were back in power, the federal government failed to
pass voting rights enforcement legislation. This "signaled to the South
that the federal government was not prepared to act energetically to
guarantee the voting rights of blacks" (p. 110). When Democrats sub-
sequently regained control of the federal government, "they amplified
that signal by repealing the enforcement acts of the 1870s" (p. 111).
The Southern states then moved systematically to disfranchise black
voters. A wave of constitutional conventions resulted in poll taxes,
cumulative poll taxes (requiring that back taxes as well as current
taxes be paid as a condition to voting), literacy tests, lengthy residence
requirements, elaborate registration systems, and disfranchisement on
conviction of a host of petty crimes.
These provisions had the potential to exclude poor whites as well
as blacks. To protect whites, "[m]any of the disfranchising laws were
designed expressly to be administered in a discriminatory fashion ....
Small errors in registration procedures or marking ballots might or
might not be ignored at the whim of election officials; taxes might be
1515May 2002]
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paid easily or only with difficulty; tax receipts might or might not be
issued" (p. 112).
Literacy tests permitted officials to determine whether the poten-
tial voter's "understanding" of the tested reading was adequate. Some
states relied on grandfather clauses, which exempted men from the lit-
eracy, tax or other requirements if they had performed military service
or if they or their ancestors had been entitled to vote before 1866.
When the Supreme Court held the grandfather clause to be a palpable
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment,29 many Southern states came
to rely on the whites-only Democratic Party as a means of effectively
excluding blacks from politics.3" Moreover, many Southern
Democratic leaders were happy to exclude poor whites as well as
blacks. "[T]he late-nineteenth-century effort to transform the South's
electorate was solidly grounded in class concerns as well as racial an-
tagonisms" (p. 114). The poll tax, the literacy tests and the other new
measures could be used to produce a more "qualified" and more con-
servative electorate, and to weaken the political power of white
Populists, small farmers, industrial workers, Republicans and other
groups.31 These measures, thus, reflected and shaped political struggles
among whites, as well as the conflict between whites and blacks. Both
black and white voting were sharply reduced. Immediate post-
Reconstruction turnout levels of 60 to 85 percent dropped to 50 per-
cent for whites and plummeted to single digits for blacks (p. 115).
A similar, albeit less drastic, pattern arose in the North in response
to the emergence of a substantial urban industrial working class, often
composed of immigrants and their children. Many old-stock Ameri-
cans began to voice deep concerns about the future of American gov-
29. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); see also Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268 (1939). The invalidation of the grandfather clause was an unusual action by the Supreme
Court to vindicate the antidiscrimination principle in voting. More commonly the Court
stayed out, accepting that nonracial tests like the poll tax did not implicate the Fifteenth
Amendment, and treating local restrictions on voting as essentially beyond the Court's pur-
view. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); see also Richard H. Pildes, Democracy,
Anti-Democracy and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2000) (discussing the signifi-
cance of Giles in early twentieth century voting rights jurisprudence).
30. The Supreme Court initially found that federal constitutional and statutory protec-
tion of elections or the vote applied only to general elections and not to party primaries,
which were seen as "in no sense elections for an office, but merely methods by which party
adherents agree upon candidates." Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 250 (1921). The
Court did find that a state law expressly disqualifying nonwhites from voting in party prima-
ries violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927), but a party's decision, by party resolution, to restrict party membership
and, thus, qualification to vote in party primaries, to whites, did not violate either the Four-
teenth or the Fifteenth Amendment. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). Only in 1944
did the Court find that the constitutional ban on racial discrimination applies to party restric-
tions on primary voting. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
31. Many of these whites strongly resisted the disfranchising legislation. Pp. 112-13. On
the other hand, many poor and lower-middle-class whites supported these suffrage exclu-
sions. See p. 114.
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ernment if industrial workers, particularly immigrants - seen as poor,
ignorant, indifferent to American traditions, supportive of corrupt
ethnic-basedparty machines, or committed to alien and radical beliefs
- were able to use their votes to shape the political process. New
franchise restrictions were justified as necessary to "purify" the elec-
torate (p. 127) and protect against fraud.
Avoiding a direct challenge to the elimination of property tax re-
quirements for state elections,32 many states adopted, or authorized
local adoption, of tax-payment requirements in local elections, par-
ticularly bond issues, and in some special districts.33 More states
adopted pauperage exclusions barring recipients of public aid or resi-
dents of poorhouses and charitable institutions from voting,34 length-
ened durational residency requirements (which particularly burdened
mobile manual workers),35 and, like their Southern counterparts, ex-
panded felon disfranchisement laws.36 The tide also turned against
alien suffrage. Within a few years after World War I citizenship was
everywhere a requirement for voting. Indeed, several states made it
more difficult for naturalized citizens to vote, either by requiring them
to present their naturalization papers to local election officials or by
establishing waiting periods after naturalization before the new citizen
could vote.37
As in the South, a significant new substantive restriction on the
franchise was the literacy test. Like the property requirement of the
colonial era, the literacy test could be seen as improving the quality of
electoral decisionmaking by providing for educated voters and, with
tests in English, increasing the likelihood voters would be familiar with
American values and institutions. Unlike the property test, the literacy
test was ostensibly class-neutral, although the literacy exclusion in fact
tended to operate on both class and ethnic lines. For that very reason,
literacy tests were strongly opposed by low-income people, the for-
eign-born, and the parties representing them. Although literacy tests
were widespread, they were far from universal. Still, by the mid-1920s,
thirteen northern and western states - which tended to be states with
32. Indeed, several states with residual property or tax requirements from the pre-Civil
War era abolished those restrictions. P. 130.
33. See pp. 130-34.
34. See pp. 134-36. The pauperage exclusion could have real bite in times of class con-
flict. In one notorious case, striking textile workers in New Bedford, Massachusetts who
"sought public relief to help tide them over months without income," were threatened with
disqualification from voting. P. 135.
35. See pp. 146-51.
36. See pp. 162-63.
37. See p. 138.
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large immigrant populations and strong Republican parties 8 - as well
as eight southern states, had adopted literacy tests.
At least as important as the substantive criteria for voting were
new procedures. The late nineteenth century witnessed the rapid-fire
adoption of two measures - the secret ballot and pre-election day
registration - which made it more difficult for poorer, working class,
foreign-born and uneducated people to vote. Both the secret ballot
and registration systems were intended to prevent fraud and corrup-
tion. But, as Keyssar notes, the secret ballot also operated as a de
facto literacy test for illiterate voters who now had to vote on their
own.39 Registration requirements particularly burdened working peo-
ple who were often unable to get to the registration office during the
limited days and hours when registration was permitted, and who then
had to reregister if they changed residences, even if they moved only a
short distance within the same city but to a different precinct. As in
the South, voter registration laws were open to administrative discre-
tion and abuse. Many registration laws "emerged from a convergence
of partisan interest with sincere concern about electoral fraud"
(p. 156), as conservative, rural-dominated state legislatures at times
limited registration requirements to the large immigrant-dominated
cities and adopted rules aimed at urban voters.4' In many cities, voter
turnout dropped, sometimes sharply, after registration systems were
adopted.41
The rollback of the franchise did not proceed nearly as far in the
North as it did in the South. A much more competitive party system,
the partial incorporation of immigrant and working class voters into
the political process, and a more fluid and heterogeneous social struc-
ture resulted in a milder pattern of exclusion than the "draconian,
sweeping and violent" (p. 170) actions in the South. Nevertheless, both
North and South engaged in "the legal contraction of the franchise"
38. See p. 145. New York, with the largest immigrant population in the nation, passed a
constitutional requirement instituting a literacy test in 1921. "[P]rospective voters were
obliged either to pass a stringent English-language reading and writing test administered by
the Board of Regents or present evidence that they had at least an eighth-grade education in
an approved school." P. 145. The test effectively reduced the voting rolls; as "roughly 15 per-
cent of all those who took the English-language literacy test between 1923 and 1929...
[failed] and it seems safe to assume (as did contemporaries) that many more potential voters
did not take the test because they thought they had little chance of passing." P. 146.
39. See pp. 142-43.
40. See pp. 156-57. Specific registration requirements - the length of the registration
period, its proximity to the date of an election, the size of registration districts, whether reg-
istration was considered "permanent" or whether the voter had to register periodically even
if he hadn't moved; the necessity of documentary evidence of eligibility - varied from state
to state, within states, and over time. These rules were often shaped by partisan political
concerns, and in turn affected the degree to which registration requirements were serious
obstacles to voting. See pp. 156-57.
41. See pp. 158-59.
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(p. 170). The principal exception to this pattern of retrenchment was
the Nineteenth Amendment, 42 but even the enfranchisement of
women was shaped by the anti-democratic impulse of the era. Al-
though much of the resistance to women suffrage reflected concerns
about the impact of women voting on family life - it might cause divi-
sions between husbands and wives - and on women themselves -
participation in the rough and tumble of political life would topple
women from the pedestal on which men sought to place them43 - op-
position was also consistent with "the generally declining faith in de-
mocracy .... To some degree... the resistance to enfranchising
women was a resistance to enfranchising any new voters at all"
(p. 194). Some suffragists sought to link up their cause to the class and
ethnic biases of the era, arguing that votes for educated, middle class
native-born white women would offset the votes of illiterate blacks
and foreigners. 4  For a time many women's suffrage advocates sup-
ported literacy tests.45 The alliance with conservative forces, however,
did little to advance the vote for women. Rather, the drive for women
suffrage gained significant political momentum only after it shifted to
the left and linked up with the Progressives' social reform agenda and
the interests of immigrants and labor.
In the end, like the propertyless after the Revolution, and blacks
after the Civil War, women benefitted from a war. In 1918, President
Wilson, citing the "sacrifice and suffering and toil" (p. 216) made by
women for the American effort in World War I, came out strongly in
favor of a federal suffrage amendment. Recognition of women's con-
tributions to the war also proved critical to ratification. However, the
provision of votes for women had little immediate impact on Ameri-
can politics, on thinking about the franchise, or on other voting rules.
D. World War II and After: The Return to Democracy
"The equilibrium in voting laws was decisively disrupted by World
War II" (p. 244). The rise of totalitarianism abroad, and, especially,
the racist ideology of our Nazi opponents, "spawned a popular em-
brace of democracy more vigorous than any that had occurred since
the most optimistic moments of Reconstruction.... [T]he war against
Germany and Japan (and then the cold war) led many Americans to
renew their identification with democratic values" (p. 245). The ten-
sion between our democratic commitments and widespread disfran-
42. Another pro-democratic development, which Keyssar does not discuss, is the adop-
tion of the Seventeenth Amendment, providing for the popular election of United States
Senators.
43. See p. 191.
44. See pp. 190-91.
45. See pp. 199-200.
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chisement, particularly of blacks, became a political issue. So, too, the
massive mobilization of millions of adult men again raised the ques-
tion of why those who were required to serve their country and risk
loss of life were unable to vote. Black leaders and returning black war
veterans "sought to make good on the nation's rhetorical promises" by
seeking the vote.46 "The rejections that these veterans often encoun-
tered - ranging from closed registration offices to grotesquely rigged
literacy tests to violent beatings - attracted widespread national at-
tention" (p. 250). The 1947 report of President Truman's Committee
on Civil Rights found that the international interests of the United
States in the Cold War were threatened by racial discrimination at
home, and called for federal action to eliminate the poll tax and pre-
vent racial discrimination in voting.
Although the President and Congress were slow to act - there
would be no federal voting rights legislation for another decade - the
Supreme Court struck the first significant blow by invalidating the
white-only primary.47 In the one-party South, the white primary had
been a front line of defense against black political participation. The
elimination of the white primary provided blacks with a greater incen-
tive to register, and placed greater weight on - and gave greater ex-
posure to - the literacy test, the poll tax, discriminatory registration
procedures, and the intimidation of black registrants and voters. Black
registration began to rise, as did black (and Northern white) pressure
for federal intervention. In 1957, Congress passed the first federal civil
rights law in more than eighty years, providing a legal basis for the
Justice Department to participate in voting rights cases. The Civil
Rights Act of 1957 and a second measure adopted in 1960 "had few
teeth and little impact" (p. 260). However, by 1960 the popular cam-
paign against voting (and other forms of) discrimination had become a
mass movement, marked by sit-ins, freedom riders, marches, rallies,
petitions, and widespread voter registration drives. The "growing mili-
tance of the black freedom movement" (p. 262) in turn spawned a
massive, and often violent, Southern white resistance.
At the urging of President Lyndon Johnson, the federal govern-
ment finally, and decisively, intervened with the Voting Rights Act of
1965, which suspended literacy and other tests; authorized the use of
federal examiners to enroll voters; and, to preclude new discrimina-
tory measures, required "covered jurisdictions" - defined by their
prior use of now illegal tests plus low voter turnout - to obtain fed-
eral "preclearance" before changing their electoral rules and proce-
dures. Subsequently amended in 1970, 1975, and 1982 - and broad-
ened to provide, inter alia, new protections for language minorities,
46. See p. 250.
47. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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and to address voting measures that were discriminatory in effect, not
just in intent - the Voting Rights Act contributed to an immediate
and substantial increase in black voting. This period also witnessed the
ratification of two new constitutional amendments that expanded the
franchise.48 The Twenty-fourth Amendment prohibited the use of poll
taxes in federal elections.49 The Twenty-sixth Amendment lowered the
voting age - which had been twenty-one since the colonial era - to
eighteen. Like so many other expansions of the franchise, it too was a
response to war - in this case, the unpopular Vietnam War, and the
exposure of eighteen-year-olds to the draft.5"
But the most significant development in constitutional law was not
amendments to the constitutional text but the change in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence. Before the 1960s, the Court had consistently
rejected the idea of a general constitutional right to vote. The point is
best illustrated by the Court's 1875 decision in Minor v. Happersett,51
denying a woman's claim, under the newly-ratified Fourteenth
Amendment that, as a citizen of the United States and the state of
Missouri, she was entitled to vote in federal and state elections. The
Court agreed she was a citizen but dismissed the idea that voting was a
right of citizenship, finding that voting was a matter for state determi-
nation subject only to specific constitutional limitations, such as the
Fifteenth Amendment. Although Minor's holding concerning women
was overturned by the Nineteenth Amendment, the Court adhered to
Minor's approach to voting until the 1960s, upholding registration re-
48. The Twenty-third Amendment's provision for the District of Columbia to cast elec-
toral votes in the presidential election ought to be counted in this tally as well. Interestingly,
and consistent with the Constitution's general eighteenth century approach to the selection
of the Electoral College, the amendment does not provide for a popular vote for the electors
chosen by the District. Rather, the District's electors shall be appointed "in such manner as
the Congress may direct." U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
49. The Twenty-fourth Amendment ultimately had little significance since two years
after its ratification the Supreme Court, in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966), held unconstitutional all poll taxes, in state as well as federal elections. See infra text
accompanying note 56.
50. See pp. 277-81. The path to the eighteen-year-old vote was complex. Congress ini-
tially acted by statute, tacking the lowered voting age on to the 1970 amendments to the
Voting Rights Act. The measure fragmented the Supreme Court, with four justices finding
that Congress had authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to lower the voting age in
both federal and state elections; four justices finding that Congress had no authority to set
the voting age in any elections; and Justice Black finding that Congress had authority under
Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution to lower the voting age for federal but not state elec-
tions. Justice Black's opinion became the judgment of the Court. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970). Faced with the prospect of different voting ages for different elections,
Congress immediately passed a constitutional amendment lowering the voting age for all
elections, and, in "the most rapid [process] in the history of the republic," the requisite
thirty-eight states quickly ratified it. P. 281.
51. 88 U.S. (1 Wall.) 162 (1874).
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quirements 2 lengthy durational residency laws,53 the poll tax, 4 and
the literacy test.55
In the 1960s, the Court changed direction and held voting to be a
fundamental right for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court in-
validated the poll tax; 6 tax payment requirements for voting in mu-
nicipal bond issues57 and school board elections;58 and durational resi-
dency requirements longer than fifty days.59 The Court flatly barred
property ownership and tax payment requirements, 6° and indicated it
would look closely and suspiciously at tests justified in terms of im-
proving the quality of electoral decision-making. 6 The Court also up-
held Congress's authority to ban literacy tests nationwide.62
Notwithstanding the elimination of many restrictions on voting,
many observers in the 1970s and 1980s noted that turnout remained
low, and they blamed the voter registration system. 63 Voting rights ac-
tivists sought reforms that would remove the need for the voter to trek
to an inconvenient registration office, at a specified time during the
work day, and to do so again whenever he or she moved.
To address these concerns, President Clinton signed the National
Voter Registration Act ("NVRA") into law in 1993.' The federal
voter registration law required states to offer, inter alia, registration by
mail, "agency registration" - that is enrollment at a variety of public
facilities, including welfare offices, libraries, and motor vehicle bu-
52. Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328 (1900). Like many early registration requirements,
Missouri's requirement applied only to the state's larger cities such as St. Louis, Kansas City
and St. Joseph.
53. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
54. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
55. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
56. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
57. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395
U.S. 701 (1969).
58. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
59. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
60. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666 ("Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to
paying.., any.., tax."). Harper also spelled the end of the pauperage exclusion. Within a
few years these were either repealed or treated as dead letters. Pp. 271-72.
61. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 354-60; Kramer, 395 U.S. at 631-33; Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89 (1965).
62. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 131-34 (1970) (Black, J.); id. at 144-47 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part); id. at 216-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part); id. at 231-36 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting in part); id. at 282-84 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part).
63. See, e.g., FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T
VOTE (1989).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (1994).
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reaus - and "motor voter" registration, that is the attachment of reg-
istration forms to the application for a driver's license. Although the
NVRA applies only to registration to vote in federal elections, the
states chose to modify the rules for their own elections to avoid the
cost and difficulty of maintaining separate federal and nonfederal reg-
istration systems. Within two years, the law resulted in a net addition
of nine million new registrants, or about 20% of the unregistered -
although there was no significant impact on voter turnout (pp. 314-15).
In most states, voters are still required to register some time before
election day as a precondition for voting, although a very small num-
ber of states have either eliminated registration requirements outright
or permitted same day registration. But the NVRA was a "critical step
in dismantling the multiple impediments" (p. 315) previously adopted.
It also constituted yet another move towards the nationalization of
voting requirements.
III. VOTING AS A RIGHT?
Keyssar concludes his study on the "partially happy" note that
"nearly all adult citizens of the United States are legally entitled to
vote" (p. 316). However, even after the plethora of constitutional
amendments, federal statutes, and judicial decisions of the last several
decades, we still have something less than universal suffrage. More
importantly, notwithstanding the extensive focus on who can vote,
which has been central to both Keyssar's study and legal analysis, we
have given relatively little attention to what voting is supposed to ac-
complish, and what the role of voting in the political process is sup-
posed to be.
A. Continuing Limitations on Who Can Vote
Despite increased access to voting, we do not yet have universal
adult suffrage in the United States. Felon disenfranchisement laws,
residency requirements, and a citizenship test continue to limit the
number of adults eligible to vote, while our election machinery bur-
dens the ability of legally qualified voters to actually cast their ballots
and have them counted.
Currently, 4.2 million adult citizens - or about 2.1% of the voting
age population - are denied the franchise on account of current or
prior felony conviction. Every state but two disfranchises incarcerated
felons; twenty-nine states prevent convicted felons from voting after
their release from prison or jail, but while they are on parole or proba-
tion; fourteen states continue disfranchisement for some period be-
yond the term of incarceration, probation and parole. Eleven states
disfranchise felons for life; nine for a single felony conviction. One-
third of the people disqualified by a felony conviction are felons who
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have completed their sentences, and more than another third are on
probation or parole. Less than thirty percent are currently incarcer-
ated.65 According to one recent study, in those states that permanently
deny felons the right to vote "the impact on the electorate is sizable,"
ranging from 3.2% of the voting age population in Maryland to 6.2%
in Alabama and Florida.'
It is difficult to see how the disfranchisement of felons, particularly
those who have served their time, could survive strict judicial scrutiny.
The Supreme Court, however, has determined that strict scrutiny does
not apply. In Richardson v. Ramirez67 - decided in 1974; or after the
Court had declared the vote to be a fundamental right - the Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment's provision reducing the repre-
sentation in Congress of a state that denies the vote to its adult male
citizens "except for participation in rebellion, or other crime" implic-
itly authorizes disfranchisement for conviction of a crime. Thus, a
remnant of the nineteenth century vision of the vote as state-granted
privilege was carried forward by the late-twentieth century Court.
The disfranchisement of convicted felons bears particularly heavily
on African Americans, especially African-American men. Nationally,
6.57% of voting age blacks are disqualified by the felon exclusion. As
95% of felons are male, the felony disfranchisement rate for black
men is approximately 13%. In some states, the numbers are much
higher. In Florida, for example, 13.77% of voting age African
Americans, and, thus, about one-quarter of voting age black men, are
disqualified.' In Hunter v. Underwood,69 the Supreme Court held un-
constitutional an Alabama law, adopted as part of the general pro-
gram of suffrage reduction in 1901, that disfranchised persons con-
victed of certain misdemeanors. Based on historical evidence, the
Court found that the measure was aimed at blacks, with the misde-
meanors triggering disfranchisement selected because of the assump-
tion that those crimes were committed primarily by blacks. It is not
clear if Hunter is limited to the use of misdemeanors. Moreover,
Hunter relied on proof of racially discriminatory intent, and such in-
tent will often be difficult to prove.70 Voting rights activists have ar-
65. John Mark Hansen, Task Force on the Federal Election System, Disfranchisement of
Felons (July 2001), in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE
AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECrORAL PROCESS (Aug. 2001).
66. Id. at 1.
67. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
68. See Hansen, supra note 65, at 1.
69. 471 U.S. 222 (1985); see also McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.
Miss. 1995) (Mississippi's disfranchisement of misdemeanants violates equal protection
clause).
70. See, e.g., Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that later reenact-
ment of felon exclusion supersedes the previous provision and removes the discriminatory
taint from the original Redeemer Era version).
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gued that felon disfranchisement laws run afoul of the discriminatory
impact test of the Voting Rights Act.71 But the courts have been reluc-
tant to so find.72
A second, even less legally controversial, prerequisite for voting is
residency. The Supreme Court has indicated that a residency require-
ment "may be necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political
community, and therefore could withstand close constitutional scru-
tiny. ' 73 But the effects of state and local government decisions are not
limited to residents. Millions of commuters, migrant workers, and sec-
ond home owners are subject to local taxation, law enforcement, and
land use regulation, and depend on locally-provided public services in
communities where they spend considerable time on a regular basis
but are unable to vote. Moreover, in this era of easy mobility, afflu-
ence, and early retirement, with many households maintaining more
than one home,74 it is sometimes difficult to determine someone's
community of residence. Both the definition of residence for voting
purposes and the denial of the vote to someone with significant ties to
a community because he or she is also a resident of another commu-
nity are increasingly contested.75
Perhaps the largest group of people in the United States not enti-
tled to vote are noncitizens. In 2000, there were approximately 28.4
million foreign born people in the United States, accounting for about
10.4% of the population. About 10.6 million, or 37% of this group, are
naturalized, leaving about 18 million noncitizens, of whom about 16
million are of voting age.76 Like other residents, aliens are subject to
state and local regulation, taxation, and law enforcement, and depend
71. See, e.g., Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disfranchisement Under
the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 Yale L.J. 537 (1993).
72. See, e.g., Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255
(6th Cir. 1986).
73. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972); accord Holt Civic Club v. City of Tus-
caloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1978) ("[O]ur cases have uniformly recognized that a govern-
ment unit may legitimately restrict the right to participate in its political processes to those
who reside within its borders.").
74. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY, GENERAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS (1995) (1.8 million households, constituting 1.9 %
of all households, maintain two residences as homes).
75. See, e.g., Fred Bayles, "Seasonal" Residents Fight for Expanded Rights: Having a Say
vs. Having to Pay Splits Several Vacation Towns, USA TODAY, May 23, 2000, at 6A; John
Flesher, Part-time Residents Feel Taxed by Laws, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug. 13, 2000, at
A27; Blaine Harden, Summer Residents Want a Year-Round Voice, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,
2000, at Al; Part-Time Residents Seek Full-Time Say, RECORD (Northern New Jersey), Aug.
21, 2000, at A03; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-6 (West 1999) (authorizing nonresi-
dent taxpayers to vote in certain local elections); May v. Town of Mountain Vill., 132 F.3d
576 (10th Cir. 1997) (upholding constitutionality of local decision to enfranchise nonresident
property owners).
76. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: MARCH 2000, THE
FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 2001).
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on states and localities for basic public services, including public
safety, sanitation, and education. Whatever the possible justification,
in terms of a potential conflict of national loyalties, for excluding non-
citizens from participating in national governance, it seems more diffi-
cult to explain - certainly if strict judicial scrutiny is applied - the
exclusion of resident aliens from voting in state and local elections.
In the past, as many as sixteen states authorized aliens to vote.77
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Minor v. Happersett cited the enfran-
chisement of aliens as grounds for rejecting the argument that the suf-
frage is a right of citizenship.78 Today, in an echo of an older tradition
- before the nationalization of voting rules - in which localities of-
ten had different suffrage criteria than their states,79 a handful of
school districts permit aliens whose children are in local schools to
vote in community school board elections, and at least one locality
permits aliens to vote in municipal elections.8" With these exceptions,
however, resident aliens are unenfranchised, even at the state and lo-
cal level. This presents no current constitutional issue. The Supreme
Court has found that the "exclusion of aliens from basic governmental
processes is not a deficiency in the democratic process but a necessary
consequence of the community's process of political self-definition."81
One arguably ironic consequence of the Court's new doctrine that
voting is a presumptive right of adult resident citizens is the elimina-
tion of any constitutional claim to voting by noncitizens.
Apart from formal limitations on the franchise, the Florida 2000
election demonstrated to all Americans the ongoing significance of
state and local administrative decisions, particularly ballot design and
the selection and maintenance of voting machinery, in making the
right to vote effective (or ineffective). Bush v. Gore simultaneously
opened the door to federal constitutional review of state and local
administrative decisions, and then tried to shut it by declaring that the
Court's consideration was "limited to present circumstances, for the
problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents
many complexities. 82 The Court specifically keyed its decision to "the
special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single
state judicial officer"83 - a relatively rare occurrence. The Court's fo-
77. See Table A-12.
78. 88 U.S. at 162, 177 (1874).
79. See pp. 6, 20-21, 30-31, 166-68, 186.
80. P. 310. Several foreign countries also permit resident aliens to vote in local elections.
See p. 310.
81. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982).
82. 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).
83. Id.
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cus on intrastate disparities may limit the case's relevance to adminis-
trative practices that burden all voters in a state.
Nevertheless, despite the Court's effort to limit the decision's ef-
fect, Bush v. Gore, coupled with the national reaction to the spectacle
of tens of thousands of uncounted and miscounted votes in Florida,
appears to be having an impact in prodding states to upgrade their
vote-counting machinery.' As with the elimination of property re-
quirements in the nineteenth century, and the reform of voter registra-
tion in the late twentieth century, voting administration reform may
result from political actions, or - given Bush v. Gore - a twenty-first
century interplay of litigation and legislation. Still, until Congress and
the states give serious attention (and funding) to the machinery and
procedures for tabulating votes, it is likely that millions of votes will
continue to be lost each election day.85
B. Beyond Equality: The Substantive Meaning of the Right to Vote
Both the historical development of the right to vote and contem-
porary constitutional doctrine have focused primarily on the equal
availability of the vote, and equal treatment of those eligible to vote,
rather than the right to vote per se. Even as the equal right to vote has
expanded, the substantive meaning of the right to vote has remained
undeveloped and the relationship between voting and other mecha-
nisms that shape our political process and structure our democracy
remains contested.
Thus, there is no general constitutional right to vote, that is, to
have political decisions made, or political officials chosen, by popular
vote. The election of members of Congress follows from specific pro-
visions in the constitutional text. As Bush v. Gore has reminded us,
there is no right to vote for president and vice-president. There is no
federal constitutional right to vote for the governor of one's state,8 6 or
to have an elected local government.87 Arguably, the republican form
84. See B.J. Palermo, Suits Push Three States to End Punch-Card Voting: California De-
cision is the Latest Action, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 2002, at Al.
85. See CALTECH/MIT STUDY, supra note 3.
86. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1967). The Supreme Court has held, however, as a
matter of statutory interpretation, that the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act
apply to a state's decision to convert an elected position into an appointed one. Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
87. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978). Moreover, the
rules of universal suffrage and one person, one vote do not apply to certain elected local
governments that exercise only special, limited powers. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
Such districts, including water storage districts, transportation finance districts, see, e.g., So.
Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen, 822 P.2d 875 (Cal. 1992), and business improvement dis-
tricts, Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, Inc., 158 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1998), may use
property ownership or tax payment criteria in determining who may vote for their governing
boards.
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of government secured to the states by the Guarantee Clause requires
the election of state legislatures, but given the Supreme Court's un-
willingness to give content to that Clause - exemplified by the nine-
teenth century case in which the Supreme Court refused to consider
the legitimacy of actions taken by Rhode Island's limited-suffrage
freeholder government against proponents of the more democratic
"people's constitution"88 
- even that proposition cannot be stated
with certainty.89
Nor, despite the Supreme Court's equation of the right to vote
with the right to an equally weighted vote, is there a right to have elec-
tions decided by popular majorities. A supermajority voting require-
ment, in which a sufficiently large minority can block the wishes of the
majority, is constitutionally valid as long as the requirement is not tar-
geted against a distinct group.9
Even when voting is allowed and widely available and majority
rule prevails, it may not be clear what the right to vote means. The
right to vote may imply a right to have choices. The Supreme Court
has held "the right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast
only for one of two parties at a time when other parties are clamoring
for a place on the ballot."9' Yet the Court has also held that the states
can use ballot access laws to narrow voters' choices and thereby pro-
mote the two-party system and political stability, by making it difficult
- but not impossible - for third parties and independents to get on
the ballot.9 Nor does the voter have the right to vote for any candi-
date he or she wants; or, more precisely, as the Supreme Court held in
Burdick v. Takushi,93 there is no right that the state "record, count and
publish" individual votes.94 Burdick upheld Hawaii's refusal to count
88. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). Luther grew out of the struggle over
the franchise in Rhode Island that culminated in the Dorr War; see supra note 23. During
that conflict, two different governments - one elected under the limited-suffrage colonial
era charter, and the other under a more democratic "people's constitution" - contended for
power. In Luther, the Supreme Court refused to review the legitimacy of punitive actions
taken by the charter government against those purporting to act under the people's constitu-
tion.
89. In addition, there is certainly no federal constitutional right to have decisions made
by voter initiative, or subject to voter referendum, although the Constitution is not a barrier
to direct democracy. See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). The
Supreme Court has occasionally celebrated the democratic values of state or local measures
authorizing voters to resolve legislative decisions directly through their ballots. See, e.g., Vill.
of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971).
90. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
91. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,31 (1968).
92. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997); Munro v.
Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Jenness
v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
93. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
94. Id. at 441.
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write-in votes. The Court emphasized that the right to vote is not sim-
ply - or not solely - a personal right of the voter to express his or
her views on electoral matters but is rather a "right to participate in an
electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity
of the democratic system.""s Given the difficulties inherent in aggre-
gating multiple individual preferences into a collective political deci-
sion "[c]ommon sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the con-
clusion that government must play an active role in structuring
elections."96
Similarly, the Court has recognized that legislative apportionment
implicates the right to vote and has held that districting schemes that
make it more difficult for racial minorities to elect representatives
violate that right.7 But the Court has also upheld legislative gerry-
manders that create large numbers of politically uncontested one-
party districts if the resulting legislature roughly mirrors the strength
of the two parties in the state as a whole.9" The stability of the two-
party system and political control over the structure of the political
process have, thus, been treated as important constitutional values
that structure and limit the right to vote.
To be sure, a state's or locality's use of structural mechanisms like
multimember districts with district-wide elections that make it difficult
for minority groups to win representation have been held to bear on
the right to vote, and, on occasion, to be unconstitutional.9 In other
cases, however, the Court has shied away from finding a connection
between the structure of an elected government, even when it bears
on the ability of minorities to elect representatives, and the right to
vote."° Moreover, our most pervasively used electoral structure -
single-member districts with plurality voting rules, as opposed to
multimember districts with some form of proportional representation
- makes it more difficult for minorities, particularly geographically
dispersed minorities, to win representation. Yet it is also constitution-
95. Id.
96. Id. at 433.
97. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). On the other hand, districting
plans that give great attention to race in order to enable racial minorities to elect representa-
tives in proportion to their numbers may be held unconstitutional as unduly race-conscious.
See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
98. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109
(1986) (gerrymandering that "consistently degrade[s]" a party's influence in the state as a
whole is subject to constitutional challenge).
99. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
100. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994). Moreover, structural changes that reduce the
decisionmaking authority of elected officials have been held not to implicate the right to
vote within the meaning of the Voting Rights Act's preclearance provision. See Presley v.
Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
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ally unexceptionable. 1 1 The right to vote has implications for the
structure of government, but, just as important, the structure of gov-
ernment - and the constitutionally permissible preference for a less
representative government - has implications for the substantive
meaning of the right to vote.
The relationship between the right to vote and the financing of
election campaigns is even more confused. On the one hand, the Court
has found that voters have a substantive interest in learning the identi-
ties of those who donate to candidates and the amounts those donors
contribute. Notwithstanding the potential infringement on freedom of
speech and association, campaign reporting and disclosure laws "aid
the voters in evaluating those who seek... office.""1 2 On the other
hand, the norms of universal suffrage and equal treatment of voters
have been held to have no bearing on the amounts of money candi-
dates and interest groups can spend on elections.0 3 The ban on wealth
tests and the "one person, one vote" rule for legislative apportionment
may be constitutionally required to protect the equal right to vote in
elections but a governmental goal of "equalizing the relative ability of
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections" may not
justify limitations on campaign expenditures.1 4
The Court's difficulties in grappling with these issues and in re-
solving the connections between the right to vote and other political
mechanisms are understandable since these questions present multi-
ple, and often conflicting, legitimate concerns. As Keyssar observes,
"universal suffrage is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a
fully democratic political order" (p. 322). Democracy requires not just
wide participation and equal treatment of voters but mechanisms for
aggregating large numbers of diverse preferences into a collective re-
sult that reflects majority sentiment, respects minority interests, com-
mands public support, and produces an effective, accountable gov-
ernment. A democratic commitment to near-universal suffrage and
"one person, one vote" apportionment does not necessarily require
easy ballot access rules, controls on gerrymandering, proportional rep-
resentation of minorities, or limits on campaign spending. On the
other hand, the uncertain health of American democracy today - low
turnout, the widespread gerrymandering of legislative districts, the
concern that the two-party system fails to represent the full range of
legitimate political interests and points of view, the central role of
101. Cf City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (holding that there is no right to
proportional representation).
102. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976).
103. Id. at 49 n.55.
104. Id. at 48.
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money in our political campaigns - suggests that our current political
rules may not be the optimal ones for promoting democracy, either.
After more than two hundred years, the battles over the legal right
to vote are now largely, if not quite entirely, ended. Keyssar's book
provides a comprehensive account of both the extent and intensity of
that struggle and the nature of its contemporary resolution. But the
meaning of the right to vote and the connection between the vote and
other American political institutions remain unresolved. In the near
future, the political and legal battles over the vote may focus on the
few remaining groups not entitled to vote and on the machinery neces-
sary for the effective translation of the votes that are cast into votes
that are counted. But critically important battles will also address
those rules and structures - legislative districting, ballot access, cam-
paign finance - that affect the choices presented to voters, and the
broader question of how voter decisions are translated into political
outcomes. Keyssar's study, and the multiple conflicting concerns pre-
sented by these issues, suggest that an early resolution is not likely,
and that the future of American democracy is likely to be as contested
as its past.
May 2002]
